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ABSTRACT 
A number of response plans and strategies have been published concerning 
preparation for an oncoming Pandemic Influenza. The majority of federal guidance and 
state planning with respect to pandemic preparation focuses excessively on the 
availability and distribution of effective vaccine and antiviral remedies — pharmaceutical 
solutions. Effective vaccines, presently unavailable, will not be in production and 
available for application for at least eight months after the onset of an identified 
pandemic. Community mitigations and interventions such as school closures, event 
cancellations, limited travel, quarantine and work at home plans are traditional responses 
to slowing the spread of a virus. In order to effectively implement these time-tested 
strategies, voluntary community compliance with interventions becomes exceedingly 
important. The recent global experience with SARS and current mathematical modeling 
of virus spread characteristics support community mitigation efforts. The community 
policing model, having evolved over the last twenty years, provides a pre-existing 
framework to engage the public in grassroots pandemic education, awareness, planning 
and problem solving partnerships. The Incident Command System provides a structure 
for a collaborative, multi-agency approach to successfully implement a community 
awareness and compliance initiative.  Community mitigations will save lives.         
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 The present and future existence, availability and potential efficacy of influenza 
vaccines and antiviral remedies to combat a pandemic are, at best, uncertain.1 In spite of 
this fact, state planning for pandemic response seems disproportionately weighted in 
favor of the use of vaccine and antiviral applications as the centerpiece of most pandemic 
response planning. While there is little doubt that vaccines, specific to a given influenza 
strain, would provide the most effective remedy for a global pandemic, such solutions are 
presently unavailable and will remain elusive until well after the start of a global 
pandemic.2 Complications facing vaccine development and manufacture includes 
predicting future strains of an influenza virus, shortcomings in manufacturing capacity,3 
and the possibility of individuals requiring multiple and extremely expensive antiviral 
applications.4 While vaccine development and related distribution planning will become 
important at some point in a future pandemic, the emphasis in current planning on 
presently nonexistent vaccines5 and pharmaceutical solutions — to the exclusion of 
comprehensive community mitigation or intervention planning — is shortsighted. Figure 
1 illustrates this goal of community mitigation. 
 
1  Center for Disease Control, Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2007), http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/commitigation.html (accessed 
February 23, 2007). 
2  Laurie Garrett, “The Next Pandemic?” Foreign Affairs July/August 2005, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84401/laurie-garrett/the-next-pandemic.html (accessed 
November 2, 2006) 
3  Staff of the Center for Bio security of UPMC, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the 
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Thoughts and Comments, December 2005 ed., Vol. 3 (Larchmont, NY: 
Mary Ann Liebert, 2005), 292, http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/abs/10.1089/bsp.2005.3.292 (accessed 
July 8, 2007). 
4  Catherine J. Luke and Kanta Subbarao, “Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza,” Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 12, no. 1 (January 2006, 2006), 68, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/pdfs/05-1147.pdf 
(accessed January 27, 2007). 
5  Staff of the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the 
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Thoughts and Comments, 292.  
   
 
Figure 1.   Goals of Community Mitigation.6  
 
 
In flattening of the pandemic peak, several immediate benefits become available for 
response. The anticipated outcomes are:  
• Delay the exponential growth in incident cases and shift the epidemic 
curve to the right in order to “buy time” for production and distribution of 
a well-matched pandemic strain vaccine  
   
• Decrease the epidemic peak thereby avoiding/mitigating overwhelming 
surge requirements in medical treatment 
 
• Reduce the total number of incident cases, thus reducing community 
morbidity and mortality 
 
 Community mitigation and interventions describe a number of overarching efforts 
to slow or temper the effects of a pandemic. As used in this thesis, mitigations include 
(alone or used in combinations), the use of school closures, limiting or canceling large 
 2
                                                 
6  Center for Disease Control, Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States, 18. 
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public gatherings, closure of airports or mass transit services, implementation of work-at-
home plans, the utilization of targeted antiviral prophylaxis (TAP), the use of personal 
protective equipment, encouraging the use of personal hygiene measures, the isolation of 
infected individuals and the use of limited or widespread quarantine. 7  When employed 
in conjunction with other preventive strategies such as pharmaceutical remedies (when 
available), many of these measures can be effective complementary tactics in slowing or 
delaying the spread of a virus.8 Some mitigating practices such as quarantine, for 
example, are well established and accepted public health practices that have been used to 
slow the spread of disease for hundreds of years.9 However, a review of a number of state 
pandemic plans, including the Massachusetts Pandemic Influenza Plan, 10 reveal fewer 
resources and inconsistent planning committed in the area of community mitigation and 
interventions. Should the country experience a pandemic, the majority of response and 
prevention relies heavily on states’ capabilities.11 The inconsistency of state plans with 
respect to community mitigation and interventions is illustrated in Appendix 1.  While 
nearly every state has a vaccine distribution plan, the development of state mitigation 
efforts is far more inconsistent. 
Community mitigation and interventions, when enacted under the stressful 
conditions of a pandemic, will require significant public support and cooperation from 
the community itself. A high level of cooperation under such stressful circumstances 
should only be anticipated after intensive, pre-event public education, open and sustained 
dialogue, transparency of planning and unprecedented levels of trust between the 
 
7  Center for Disease Control, Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance, 19. 
8  Committee on Modeling Community Containment for Pandemic Influenza, Modeling Community 
Containment for Pandemic Influenza: A Letter Report (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 
2006), http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11800.html (accessed January 25, 2007). 
9  Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Frequently Asked Questions about Isolation and 
Quarantine (Boston, Massachusetts: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2005), 
http://www.mass.gov/dph/cdc/surveillance/iq/iq_faq.pdf (accessed December 17, 2006). 
10  Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2006), 
http://www.mass.gov/dph/cdc/epii/flu/pandemic_plan.htm (accessed May 20, 2006). 
11 Scott D. Holmberg et al., State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza (Triangle Park, N.C.: 
RTI International, 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no09/06-0369.htm (accessed December 22, 
2006). 
 4
community and the government. Constructing a strategy for effective implementation of 
containment options and gaining public confidence in their implementation will prove to 
be a far more challenging obstacle than merely identifying the components of the plan. 
How to effectively implement community mitigation and intervention strategies through 
voluntary citizen compliance is a subject largely absent from national dialogue and 
currently absent from national and state pandemic planning. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 How can community mitigation practices and intervention preparation be 
effectively implemented to maximize voluntary citizen compliance with restrictive 
community mitigation or intervention measures for an oncoming pandemic influenza?   
C.  PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PROJECT 
 The public health and emergency response literature concerning pandemic 
influenza generally surrounds the health consequences of the influenza outbreak itself. 
With just three documented pandemic events in the United States within the past 100 
years, pandemics are difficult to evaluate and exceedingly difficult to predict. Morbidity 
and mortality rates of the three previous pandemic events are well documented, but 
provide little value in predicting the intensity of future occurrences. Like hurricanes, we 
can reasonably assume another pandemic is coming, but not predict its scope, intensity or 
precisely where it will make land. The current literature, until recently, has been 
generally pessimistic and dismissive of community mitigation and intervention efforts as 
an effective remedy for pandemic. Much of this pessimism can be directly attributed to 
the fact that community mitigation and interventions, on a large scale, have never been 
attempted in the United States and only in rare occurrences throughout world history.    
This study proposes an alternative approach and design for constructing and 
implementing a successful community mitigation strategy in preparation for pandemic 
influenza. Community policing models in many areas of the country have established a 
record of achievement in attaining government-public cooperation and problem solving. 
A community policing approach with extensive public support for community mitigation 
practices will result in higher and sustained levels of voluntary compliance.  
 5
                                                
This study should, at a minimum, add some degree of balance and credibility to 
the consideration and implementation of overall community mitigation strategies. As 
Homeland Security evolves and we move toward a multi-hazard, collaborative response 
capability, all remedies and potential solutions to disaster response should be adequately 
addressed and made available to decision makers. Community containment and 
interventions may not provide a viable or realistic alternative to every public health 
emergency or disaster; it may not provide a solution to the next pandemic if such an event 
is of a mild variety. However, community containment and interventions remain viable 
alternatives to be exercised by state and federal leadership. The present state pandemic 
response strategies amount to hoping for the best (that a vaccine will be available). A 
table contained in Appendix 1 illustrates the clear focus on vaccine reliance in 49 states. 
This table reflects that most all states have vaccine plans while the consistency and 
planning for containment is far more fragmented and varies greatly from state to state.12 
This thesis points the way to preparing for the worst (community mitigation and 
interventions). If planned deliberately and with integrity, executed efficiently and lead 
courageously, this thesis proposes that the public is wiling to make the necessary and 
requested sacrifices that will lead to voluntary compliance.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature concerning pandemic influenza, perhaps in the form of 
the Avian or Bird Flu, or perhaps in another, unanticipated mutation, reveals some 
recently changing trends. For the past several years, on a weekly basis, new articles, 
thoughts, studies or theories appear in scholarly journals, as well as in the mainstream 
media, concerning pandemic influenza. However, significant questions and gaps remain 
in the literature with respect to our collective national response capability in a worst-case 
pandemic influenza scenario.  
Advancements in American medicine and public health science since the 1918 
pandemic have been remarkable, certainly in the area of virology and epidemiology. 
Those same advances may have inadvertently contributed to a decline in overall 
 
12  Holmberg et al, State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza. 
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government public health capacity.13 As a consequence, overconfidence in medical 
technology may be lending itself to a false sense of security. Much of the literature and 
planning concerning pandemic influenza preparation has surrounded the distribution of 
vaccines. The speed and efficiency of domestic and international travel has also 
undergone exponential change as well. A global pandemic can now spread at speeds 
never imagined in 1918.   
Writing in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Joseph Barbera and 
colleagues wrote that “historically, quarantine was a recognized public health tool used to 
manage some infectious disease outbreaks, from the plague epidemic in the 13th century 
to the influenza epidemics of the 20th century.”14 Once ordered, enforcement and 
maintenance of a quarantine order would logically default to law enforcement and 
possibly to elements of the military as well. The discussion of community interventions 
and quarantine implementation within response plans at the state and local level is 
typically ambiguous and disconnected from state to state.15 16 An article attesting to this 
very inconsistency was written by Scott D. Holmberg and several other contributing 
authors in a September 2006 article for Emerging Infectious Diseases entitled, “State 
Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza.”17 Holmberg noted that, with respect to 
state containment policy, “confusion and lack of specificity exist in these posted state 
plans in proposing practical containment measures in the community.”18  
In our recent history, the SARS outbreak of 2003 presents an example of recent, 
significant-scale mitigation implementations.  But even the SARS experience involves 
 
13  National Governor’s Association, State Strategies for Fully Integrating Public Health into 
Homeland Security (Washington, DC: National Governor’s Association, 2005), www.public-
health.uiowa.edu/icphp/docs/NGA-Report.pdf (accessed December 15, 2006). 
14  Joseph Barbera et al., “Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United 
States,” JAMA 286 (2001), http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/286/21/2711 (accessed December 10, 
2006).   
15  Holmberg et al., State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza, 3. 
16  Lauran Neergaard, “State Pandemic Preparations Vary Widely,” Washington Post, December 16, 
2006,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/16/AR2006121600404_pf.html  
(accessed February 22, 2007). 
17 Holmberg et al., State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza, 3. 
18  Ibid. 
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divergent practices. Mark Rothstein and others, writing for the Institute of Bioethics at 
the University of Louisville, described the Canadian version of quarantine and 
containment. The Canadian policy, according to Rothstein, made use of an intensive, 
public educational process while containment success depended heavily on public 
cooperation.19 To the extent that it is known, the Rothstein Report attempts to detail the 
enforcement activity associated with mandated quarantine restrictions in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The literature illustrates that Chinese government officials 
themselves were held criminally responsible for the enforcement of quarantine orders. 
Those persons involved in rioting, looting or disrupting the quarantine were subject to 
increasingly severe levels of punishment up to and including the death penalty.20  
Statistics and factual information on its use remains elusive. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the Chinese government, at least in terms of posture if not substance, took an aggressive 
stance toward quarantine and mitigation enforcement. In the United States, government 
officials tend to avoid discussing the use of force21 as a means of intervention 
enforcement. Consequently, references to community mitigation and interventions as 
effective tools in present planning remain vague if not avoided completely. Training and 
education for law enforcement officers concerning public health law and quarantine 
enforcement is equally vague. 
Consistently, the literature expounds the fact that any significant pandemic 
outbreak will bring about and require coordination at all levels of government since there 
will likely be considerable jurisdictional overlaps of authority. It is possible, for example, 
that federal, state and local health authorities would have separate, concurrent legal 
quarantine power in a particular situation, such as the arrival of an international flight at a 
 
19  Mark A. Rothstein, et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS (Louisville, 
Kentucky: Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law University of Louisville School of Medicine, 
2003), http://louisville.edu/medschool/ibhpl/images/pdf/SARS%20REPORT.pdf (accessed December 15, 
2006). 
20  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu, Large Majority of 
Americans Willing to make Major Changes in their Lives (Boston, MA: Harvard University, 2006), 1-4,  
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/press10262006.html (accessed November 27, 2006). 
21  Brian Friel, “Bird Flu Fears Raise Quarantine Questions,”  National Journal, October 25, 2005, 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1005/102505nj1.htm (accessed November 27, 2006). 
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large city airport.22  Even the guidance documents are vague on these interconnections. 
The National Response Plan’s Biological Incident Annex23 outlines the responsibility of 
a governor at the state level to implement distancing or isolation criteria, but also 
immediately counters that the federal government may be required to intercede to protect 
the interstate spread of disease. The National Response Plan is the primary mechanism or 
blueprint for coordination of a federal pandemic response.24 According to the National 
Response Plan and the Stafford Act, the most likely scenario to engage federal assets 
would result from a request from states for assistance in enforcement of a local or 
regional intervention. Under the authority of the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 10501), the attorney general may provide law enforcement 
assistance, including federal personnel, in response to a law enforcement emergency.25
In Massachusetts, the authority for declaring a quarantine and isolation reside in a 
regulation identified as 105 CMR 300.00. The discussion of enforcing Massachusetts 
quarantine orders has historically surrounded lesser diseases, or at least those that tend to 
be isolated and minor in comparison to a global pandemic influenza.26 In Massachusetts, 
for example, the procedure for enforcement of a quarantine order is best described as 
civil litigation rather than a criminal process.27 In spite of a plethora of regulations, 
strategies and plans, there is no substantive discussion concerning how we might engage 
the public in this discussion of interventions, let alone seek their cooperation.  
 
22  Edward Richards, Richard Goodman and Stacy Milligan, Quarantine and Police Powers: The Role 
of Law Enforcement in a Biomedical Crisis (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2004). 
23  Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2004),  http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_FullText.pdf  
(accessed December 29, 2006). 
24  Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan 
(Washington, DC: Homeland Security Council, 2006), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps11-050406-01.pdf (accessed December 20, 2006). 
25  Ibid. 
26  Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Frequently Asked Questions about Isolation and 
Quarantine, 1-11. 
27  Ibid.  
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The majority of Canadians voluntarily complied with quarantine directives during 
the 2003 SARS experience.28 Cases in which law enforcement were asked to intercede or 
apprehend a violator were isolated. Similar conclusions concerning public compliance 
were drawn by Clete DiGiovanni in an article entitled “Factors Influencing Compliance 
with Quarantine in Toronto During the 2003 SARS Outbreak.” DiGiovanni concluded 
that adherence with the law had less to do with penal consequences than the fear of 
spreading disease after understanding the consequences.29 A recent Harvard School of 
Public Health survey30 indicated that the public would be highly cooperative with public 
health and government officials during a pandemic under certain conditions. These 
conditions include intensive and comprehensive pre-event education and inclusion of the 
public in the containment planning process. In May 2007, the Keystone Center published 
findings31 of their recent group study focusing on the potential for voluntary compliance 
with mitigation efforts. The results of the Keystone Study are encouraging with respect to 
the potential for voluntary compliance that can be developed with comprehensive 
planning. There is, however, a significant area of public awareness deficiency cited. The 
Harvard study indicated that 58 percent of their respondents were not familiar with the 
meaning of the term “pandemic,” and that a significant proportion had never heard of the 
term “pandemic” at all.32  Compliance with restrictions cannot be reasonably expected 
when levels of public ignorance remain at such a level. Such a high proportion of 
ignorance is also indicative that existing public awareness campaigns are not reaching the 
intended audience.    
 
28  Rothstein, et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS, 58. 
29  Clete DiGiovanni et al., “Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine in Toronto during the 
2003 SARS Outbreak,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 4 
(2004), 3. 
30  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu, Large Majority of 
Americans Willing to make Major Changes in their Lives, 1. 
31  Keystone Center, The Public Engagement Project on Community Control Measures for Pandemic 
Influenza (Keystone, CO: The Keystone Center, 2007), 
http://www.keystone.org/spp/documents/FinalReport1_CommunityControl5_2007.pdf (accessed July 14, 
2007). 
32  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu, Large Majority of 
Americans Willing to make Major Changes in their Lives, 1-4. 
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Unlike terrorist events or natural disasters, which present a long and detailed 
history for evaluation, pandemics do not provide the same level of historical data. The 
literature suggests that predicting what a 21st century pandemic will look like remains, in 
most respects, a guess.33 While some sources express skepticism concerning the 
effectiveness of community containment or interventions on a large scale, all generally 
agree that pandemic influenza, at its extreme, will tax law enforcement and government 
resources in unprecedented ways. Voluntary compliance with mitigation efforts would 
reduce the burden on government for enforcement and allow assets and resources to be 
more effectively applied to mitigating the devastating effects of a pandemic. 
There also appears to be a growing consensus, reflected in the literature, that 
while close strain vaccines may be available and have some positive consequence, close 
match, effective vaccines will remain unavailable for as long as nine months to a year 
after the onset of a pandemic. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
documented the complexities of vaccine production in detail within a 2000 report titled 
“Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State Response.”34 Table 1 






33  Holmberg et al., State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza, 1-6. 
34  United States General Accounting Office, Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State 
Response (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 2000), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/gao/nps11-120203-
04.pdf&code=31438a34382c6dd44a17600141d1facd  (accessed November 3, 2006). 
  
Table 1.   Annual Vaccine Production Process. 35 
 
 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will develop a policy recommendation for obtaining wide compliance 
with community mitigation and intervention strategy as it relates to pandemic influenza. 
In attempting to formulate a comprehensive state strategy on community containment 
best practices, the policy recommendation will consider the influence of federal laws and 
policy contained within the National Response Plan, selected and highlighted strategies 
of the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, the CDC and the state departments of public health.  
Through a comprehensive literature review, this study will examine examples of 
lessons learned, best practices and recommendations for successful implementation of 
community mitigations and intervention activity. The review will examine innovative and 
existing ideas in the literature related to community policing and methods encouraging 
voluntary, community-wide compliance with containment measures. 
The law enforcement community has experience with community policing 
models36 of the late 1990s in obtaining public input and participation in crime reduction 
                                                 
35  United States General Accounting Office, Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State 
Response, 8. 
36  M. H. Moore, “Problem-Solving and Community Policing,” Crime and Justice 15 (1992), 99–158,  
http://www.jstor.org/view/01923234/ap040015/04a00040/0 (accessed January 31, 2007). 
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and community problem solving. This thesis will examine elements of community 
policing and its evolution that emphasize community involvement and engagement of the 
public in planning processes. Research synthesized from the literature review will 
contribute to improved methods and a model for community intervention and mitigation 
compliance.  
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH 
CONTAINMENT 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL SARS EXPERIENCE 
According to the CDC, quarantine and containment measures employed to delay 
or mitigate the effects of a spreading virus have proven to be essential lifesaving 
measures.37 While the United States lacks  recent experience with infectious disease on a 
large scale, several countries throughout the world have experienced a large scale 
epidemic and have had varying degrees of success with community mitigation and 
interventions in recent years. In general, there are two approaches to implementing 
containment measures. The first method is through solicitation of voluntary public 
compliance and cooperation. This is generally accomplished through intensive public 
health education, transparency of planning and extensive risk communication. The 
second means is through forced compliance via unilateral government implementation 
and strict enforcement of containment and intervention measures. This is typically 
accomplished with substantial police or military enforcement supported by the threat of 
fines or possible imprisonment.  
The most recent global and international event or experience with an infectious 
disease occurred in 2003 with the spread of SARS. Spreading rapidly from China and 
portions of Southeast Asia and ultimately reaching Canada, SARS provides a number of 
lessons in terms of approach to response and planning.  Not the least of those lessons is 
the relative ease in which an infectious disease transverses the globe in the 21st century. 
SARS resulted in hundreds of deaths between December 2002 and June of 2003. Absent 
what Gene Matthews, writing for the “Institute of Public Health Law,” called “old 
fashioned public health control measures,”38 the mortality rate would have been, 
 
37  United States Center for Disease Control, Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance: Community 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States, 1-97. 
38  Gene Matthews, The Public/Private Response to Sudden Disease Outbreak (Atlanta, Georgia: 
Institute of Public Health Lae, 2005), http://www.cdcfoundation.org/sitefiles/TorontoReport.pdf (accessed 
November 2, 2006). 
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arguably, of catastrophic proportions. Matthews’ reference to public health measures 
points out that traditional mitigation efforts, such as quarantine or isolation in the SARS 
experience, proved to be critical elements in saving lives. The relevance of the SARS 
experience was that there was never an identifiable vaccine or pharmaceutical remedy for 
SARS. If not for aggressive community containment and intervention actions by several 
governments, SARS could have possibly resulted in hundreds of thousands of fatalities 
and spread rapidly beyond the borders of the few infected countries.  
Due to failures in international public health communication, SARS spread with 
virtually no time to pre-plan any strategic response. The governments of China, Hong 
Kong and Canada had to rapidly construct and implement alternatives to the lack of 
vaccines. Those remedies consisted of less sophisticated, basic social containment 
measures. The level of government interdiction or coercion used to enforce quarantines 
designed to mitigate SARS followed a continuum, with the least restrictive measures 
employed by the Canadian Government, slightly more restrictive in Hong Kong and the 
most restrictive government intervention in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Each of these international experiences contributes something to the global 
planning currently underway for a pandemic influenza. Each country has a different form 
of government and traditions that vary from close to that of the United States (Canada) to 
extremely distinct (PRC). To examine the relative strengths and weaknesses of various 
approaches, I have compiled an analysis of the research performed by Rothstein et al,39 in 
comparing the mitigation efforts employed in Canada, Hong Kong and the PRC (Figure 
2). Across nine categories, I assigned a value from 1 to 10 to reflect the emphasis each 
country or jurisdiction placed on that particular method of mitigation (1 being the lowest 
emphasis – 10 the highest emphasis). In the case of the PRC, the data was less 
forthcoming and available to the international community. As a result, PRC scores were 
marked low in several categories. Figure 2 illustrates that the more democratic 
governments of Canada and Hong Kong had a more engaging style of mitigation. These 
two countries relied less on the use of police or the military for forced adherence, and far 
 
39  Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS.  
more on information disclosure, public engagement, partnerships and incentives for 
compliance. The PRC relied more upon forced compliance, fines and the threat of 
imprisonment.        
 
 
Figure 2.   Values Attributed to International Mitigations. 
 
B. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
1. Strategy for Community Compliance 
The Canadian experience in achieving compliance with community mitigation 
and intervention methods requires special attention. As this thesis will propose, education 
and public engagement in the planning process, particularly in a free, democratic society, 
is an important component of any compliance strategy. In addition to reaching the 
required level of awareness, the Canadian strategy was strong because it focused 
specifically on creating economic and social incentives for compliance.  
The provincial and municipal government of Ontario and Toronto, respectively, 
established an intensive and rapidly deployed SARS educational and informational tools 
that utilized a variety of creative approaches to mitigation efforts to secure public 
compliance. In a country as large and diverse as the United States, emulating these 
approaches may be an essential ingredient for success. Among the incentives extended to 
 15
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the public were continued insurance coverage,40 intensive SARS public awareness 
programs made available through employers, and government assurances of continued 
paychecks for employees. Cases in which law enforcement was asked to intercede or 
apprehend a violator were isolated and generally the exception. Reducing the demand on 
law enforcement or the military for enforcement is a clear objective of this thesis and an 
objective obtained in Canada.  
2. Successful Partnerships 
Containment efforts in Canada became successful, in large part due to 
communication at a number of levels. One of the effective facets of this effort was the 
communication between employers and their employees. This will also be an important 
component in the development of this thesis. Employers assuring employees that jobs and 
lost wages were secure41 allowed individuals to focus more intently on health issues than 
on the concerns of financial and day-to-day subsistence obligations. Financial concern 
and the security of the family is a universal concern that must be satisfied if we are to 
expect compliance. When partnerships between government and the private sector were 
expanded and combined with effective and accurate information exchanges from the 
government, voluntary compliance appears to have followed.   Some of these same 
experiences were found in Hong Kong as well. 
C. THE HONG KONG EXPERIENCE 
1. Strategy for Community Compliance 
 The government of Hong Kong established a dual form of compliance 
characterized by both stringent government enforcement of quarantine and isolation 
measures as well as significant investment in public information and education 
campaigns .42 Similar to the Canadian example, creating public awareness and voluntary 
compliance was an important aspect of the mitigation and intervention strategy. The 
 
40  Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS.  
41  Matthews, The Public/Private Response to Sudden Disease Outbreak, 9. 
42  Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS, 81-82. 
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government of Hong Kong also recognized that while voluntary compliance was an 
objective, it was likely that forceful compliance measures would be necessary as well. 
This is equally important for planning mitigation efforts in the United States. While 
voluntary compliance is strived for, demonstrating that the government is capable of 
enforcing interventions will also contribute to compliance. 
2. Successful Partnerships 
 While it is uncertain whether this can be classified as a successful partnership, the 
Hong Kong government utilized a law known as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Ordinance.43 Under the law, employers were compelled to pay four-fifths of wages 
during a period of medical leave.44 While such a measure cannot be necessarily classified 
as a cooperative effort between employees and employers, the end result contributed to 
voluntary compliance of citizens with mitigation efforts. Just as with the Canadian 
experience, the issue of financial security was a primary concern of the public and 
required satisfaction.   
D. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA EXPERIENCE 
 The PRC, not surprisingly, took a more rigid and less engaging approach to 
containment and quarantine during the SARS period. In keeping with tradition, the PRC, 
at least initially, disclosed little to the outside world in terms of the existence and 
dispersion of the SARS virus. Years after SARS, much is still unknown in terms of 
internal mitigation and intervention efforts. The lessons that may be extended from the 
PRC to the United States are far less relevant just by virtue of the differences in 




43  Government of Hong Kong, “OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ORDINANCE,” 
Government of Hong Kong, 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/CurAllEngDoc?OpenView&Start=509&Count=30&Expand=50
9.1#509.1 (accessed August 19, 2007). 
44  Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS, 83. 
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1. Community Compliance 
 In contrast to the Canadian and Hong Kong approach to compliance, the PRC 
depended on an authoritarian approach. The central government empowered police to 
make arrests for violation of quarantine and isolation orders. 45 Unlike Hong Kong or 
Canada, the PRC made little effort to communicate accurate information with citizens 
and instead relied upon a more forced compliance method.46 The lessons that may be 
extended from the PRC to the United States are far less relevant just by virtue of the 
differences in government and social structure.    
2. Successful Partnerships 
 It is difficult to determine the level of cooperation between employees and 
employers by Western standards. The entire concept or description of a private sector has 
a different meaning in the PRC than in the preceding examples from Canada or Hong 
Kong. It is known that the PRC central government issued directives requiring payment 
of wages for those individuals quarantined,47 but there is little information available 
beyond that.   
E. INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES ON PUBLIC COMPLIANCE 
1. Survey of Attitudes Concerning Compliance 
To better understand the public perception and acceptance of mitigation and 
intervention provisions with disease, the Harvard School of Public Health and a group of 
academic researchers undertook public surveys during 2004 in Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and the United States.48 The purpose of the surveys was to measure individual 
attitudes concerning voluntary compliance with containment and intervention measures 
for some future virus. Citizens in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, at the time of the 
 
45  Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS, 83. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu, Large Majority of 
Americans Willing to make Major Changes in their Lives, 1-4. 
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survey, had recently experienced the 2003 SARS epidemic and the attempts of 
government to implement containment and quarantine procedures. While the surveys 
concluded that there was widespread support for containment or quarantine in certain 
circumstances,49 the information extracted from the study emphasized the criticality of 
trusted and reliable sources of information concerning containment policy and planning. 
If approached openly and engaging the public in the process, the surveys suggest that 
governments might expect substantial voluntary compliance and cooperation with 
containment procedures.50 This is an important point that should resonate in all 
community mitigation and intervention planning. The respondents to this survey were 
typically individuals who had recently experienced SARS and, as such, had a recent 
experience with mitigation and intervention strategy. The issue of public engagement and 
participation is a consistently important theme.    
2. Information Flow 
At the core of effective response and compliance in international scenarios was 
resourceful, consistent and trustworthy information flow. In the Canadian experience 
with SARS, the Toronto Police initially found themselves bombarded with information of 
varying credibility51 concerning the spread of the virus. As time passed and the 
government became engaged in sorting fact from folklore, those who were asked to 
submit to quarantine typically did so voluntarily52 because they were provided with 
regular streams of information upon which to make informed decisions.  In the case of 
China, at the other extreme, the government did not share information and made 
unilateral decisions outside of the public venue. In an age when information (credible and 
 
49  Robert J. Blendon et al., “Attitudes Toward the use of Quarantine in A Public Health Emergency in 




50  Ibid. 
51  Julian Fantino, “2003 SARS Outbreak: The Response of the Toronto Police Service,” The Police 
Chief, April 2005, 3, 
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&article_id=565&issue_id=4
2005 (accessed March 26, 2007). 
52  Rothstein, et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS, 58.  
otherwise) is so readily available, it was important for the government to be visible and in 
the front of all information flowing to the public. If it ever was, the government will 
never again be a single source of information but, in attempting to influence public 
decision making, it should be the most available and credible source. 
The Harvard School of Public Health survey in Table 2 illustrates the “trusted 
sources of information” or institutions that the pubic would tend to have confidence in 
when formulating their compliance decisions.53 This was cited in the study as a critical 
first step in achieving voluntary compliance. Across the four countries studied, it is 




Table 2.    Trusted Sources of Public Health Information. 54  
 
The small number (27 percent) of respondents in the United States that have trust 
or faith in the media (newspapers, magazines, TV or radio), though perhaps not 
surprising, is particularly troubling for current mitigation efforts. Earlier in 2007, the 
CDC announced that it had begun delivering advertisements and public service 
announcements to hundreds of United States radio and television outlets. The data in the 
Harvard survey would suggest that such a strategy, by itself, will be ineffective. 
                                                 
53  Blendon et al., Attitudes Toward the use of Quarantine in A Public Health Emergency in Four 
Countries, 23. 
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3. Confidence in Employers/Wages  
 Aside from the requirements for open and reliable sources of information, an 
important component of compliance was confidence that wages or jobs would not be lost 
due to illness or extended leave. The Canadian government moved to ensure that those 
asked to voluntarily comply with mitigations were assured that the government would 
assist with lost wages. Citizens became confident that they would not lose their homes or 
assets due to default while confidence in the mitigation process and voluntary compliance 
followed.  
F. LESSONS LEARNED 
While the 2003 global international experience with SARS mitigation efforts 
provides some insight into the strategies used by several countries, the application of 
those lessons to pandemic influenza can be observed at several levels. The SARS 
experience provided the first real application of mitigation strategy of the 21st century. 
Each of the three countries noted had a different form of government and, in each, the 
level of citizen participation and consultation with the process varied. Canada was the 
most open to community participation while the PRC remained the most restrictive and 
unilateral in its actions.   
SARS reinforces that virus and disease transmissions are global events with 
global health implications, not local or regional issues. The Chinese experience, for 
example, provides insight into the implications of limited communication, both internally 
and externally. The Canadian SARS experience provides more applicable lessons for the 
United States because our countries share more similarities than differences. Hong Kong 
provides examples for handling mitigation and interventions in densely populated 
metropolitan areas that are transportation hubs.   
Satisfying public needs for openness in planning, basic human needs and ensuring 
economic security are vital keys to compliance with government efforts. The fact that 
Toronto was able to quarantine approximately 30,000 people with very little resistance, 
and almost no need for law enforcement intervention, is a positive indicator that a 
comprehensive mitigation strategy can be effective on a significant scale.   
 22
As opposed to a pandemic that we have had years to prepare for, SARS provided 
little advanced warning to infected countries. There simply was no time to create 
elaborate planning or strategy. Much of the responses were ad hoc, while the threat was 
ongoing. Some tactics failed or were less successful. For example, in a world dominated 
by the Internet and an abundance of information, even a country as restrictive as the PRC 
cannot reasonably expect to keep their citizens insulated from global news. One of the 
objectives that governments may wish to accomplish is to ensure that citizens are getting 
not simply wholesale, raw information concerning infectious diseases, but rather, the 
correct information.  
SARS, a 21st century public health threat, was extinguished, not by vaccines or 
antiviral medications, but through community mitigation and, in the case of Canada, 
extraordinary cooperation and compliance of citizens.  That compliance was attained 
through: 
• Transparent and open planning 
• Clear and consistent government reporting and briefing 
• Government assistance with financial considerations 
• Collaborative partnerships between government and the private sector. 
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III. COMMUNITY MITIGATION STRATEGY AND 
INTERVENTIONS 
In the midst of the 1918 Pandemic Influenza in the United States, several cities 
successfully employed community mitigations and interventions.  Several other cities 
were not as diligent and suffered devastating consequences of the pandemic. The 
difference between the respective approaches of St. Louis and Philadelphia provide a 
valuable reference. 
In addition to analyzing U.S. history for mitigation experiences, there have been a 
number of recently published mathematical models simulating pandemic spread and 
intervention efforts. These mathematical models generally support the use of community 
mitigations. Models based upon historical data are increasingly suggesting that a 
pandemic can be slowed by aggressive and timely interventions.  
A. MITIGATION STRATEGIES USED IN THE 1918 PANDEMIC  
 Two recent studies published by the National Academies of Science in early 2007 
examined intervention strategies employed by as many as 17 United States cities during 
the 1918 pandemic.55 56 The results of these studies support the belief that community 
interventions will have significant impact in reducing the spread of influenza and 
lessening mortality rates.  Mortality rates experienced by cities such as Philadelphia and 
St. Louis were remarkably disproportionate during the 1918 influenza pandemic. The 
differences between these cities are more likely attributable to community mitigation 
efforts and the relative speed in which those restrictions and procedures were 
implemented by the community leadership at the local level.  
 
 
55  Martin C. Bootsma and Neil M. Ferguson, “The Effect of Public Health Measures on the 1918 
Influenza Pandemic in U.S. Cities,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America 104, no. 18 (April 6, 2007, 2007), 7588-7593, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0611071104  
(accessed May 2, 2007). 
56  Richard J. Hatchett, Carter E. Mecher and Marc Lipsitch, “Public Health Interventions and 
Epidemic Intensity during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States 104, no. 18 (April 6, 2007, 2007), 7582-7587, 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0610941104 (accessed May 2, 2007). 
1. The Importance of Timing: St. Louis vs. Philadelphia   
School closures, bans on large public gatherings and quarantine of infected 
households were employed in a number of U.S. cities during the 1918 pandemic.57 In 
particular, social policies in St. Louis and San Francisco, where interventions were quite 
successful, were compared with Philadelphia, which experienced devastating 
consequences of the pandemic. The first cases of influenza were reported in Philadelphia 
on September 17, 1918, but city leadership took no action for approximately 14 days.58 In 
contrast, St. Louis experienced its first cases of influenza on October 5, 1918, and took 
immediate intervention action with limitations on public gatherings, school closures and 
limited social contacts.59 The consequences were quite compelling. Figure 3 illustrates 
the differences in death rates between the two cities in 1918. 
 
Figure 3.   Philadelphia vs. St Louis. 60 
 
2. Indecisiveness and Inaction  
The disastrous consequences of indecisiveness, inaction, and not employing an 
immediate community intervention strategy in Philadelphia during the 1918 pandemic 
                                                 
57  Hatchett et al., “Public Health Interventions.” 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
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remain among the most critical lessons we can bring to pandemic preparation today. John 
M. Barry, in his book, The Great Influenza, writes extensively of the death and suffering 
that overwhelmed many American cities.61 The descriptions Barry provides of the 
Philadelphia experiences are particularly compelling and stand out with respect to lessons 
learned.  
During the week of October 16 alone, 4,597 Philadelphians died from 
influenza or pneumonia, and influenza killed more indirectly. That would 
be the worst week of the epidemic. But no one knew that at the time. 
Krusen (the public health director) had too often said the peak had passed. 
The press had too often spoken of triumph over disease.62
 
Barry’s writing speaks of the lack of leadership and the courage that is required in 
making difficult decisions. It also addresses the integrity of information flow to the public 
and the consequences of attempting to regulate the truth. 
B. ALL INFLUENZA STRAINS ARE NOT THE SAME  
The ease of transmissibility of an infectious disease is determined, for scientific 
and public health purposes, by an estimation of the number of secondary infections 
created by a single infected individual.63 In epidemiology, that level of virility or the 
reproductive value is expressed by the symbol R0. The definition of R0 is “the average 
number of secondary infections caused by a single, typical infected individual among a 
completely susceptible population.”64 The larger R0, the more aggressive or more rapidly 
the disease reproduces and spreads among the susceptible community. Conversely, the 
lower the numerical value of R0, the less virulent the disease. In many cases, as R0 of a 
virus is larger, more containment measures or combinations of containment measures will 
be required to slow the spread to a manageable level.  
 
61  John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History, 1st ed. (New 
York, NY: Penguin Group, 2005), 545. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Timothy C. Germann et al., “Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza in the United States,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103, no. 15 (April 3, 2006), 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0601266103  (accessed May 2, 2007). 
64  Ibid. 
The higher R0, the greater the percentage of infected members of the community 




Figure 4.   Intensity of Virus.65 
 
 
While the purpose of this thesis is not modeling of infectious disease, knowing 
and understanding R0 of a particular influenza strain is important to understanding the 
aggressiveness of a particular influenza. Ultimately, knowing this factor influences the 
particular strategy or operational plan for community mitigation efforts. For example, in 
some circumstances, when R0 reflects a relatively less aggressive influenza strain, 
utilizing just a few social interventions such as closing schools or targeted antiviral 
prophylaxis (TAP) may be enough to slow the pandemic. With a more aggressive strain 
(higher R0), the community may have to implement a series of pro-active efforts, such as 
school closing, TAP, travel restrictions and enforced quarantine, in order to achieve the 
same level of effectiveness.  
                                                 
65 United States Center for Disease Control, Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance: Community 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States, 24. 
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It is important to remember that these suggestions are based on R0, that is specific 
to each individual epidemic and that cannot be known for certain prior to the start of the 
epidemic itself. In modeling, current estimates of R0 are derived from extrapolation of 
data from a limited number of past events and make assumptions (and many times 
guesses) about future pandemic behavior.66  While the predictive certainty of modeling 
future pandemic behavior is speculative, it cannot be summarily dismissed either. When 
viewed against historical experiences with pandemic, and more recently with the SARS 
experience, modeling takes on added value. When combined with active pandemic 
surveillance data67 as it becomes available, the credibility of the model increases. 
C. MODELING STUDIES AND COMMUNITY INTERVENTIONS  
The models examined in this thesis were chosen based on their assumption of the 
absence of an effective vaccine (close match) and evaluate the effect that community 
mitigation efforts will have in terms of the likelihood of lowering peak mortality and 
morbidity rates.68 While there have been a number of pandemic modeling briefs 
presented and evaluated by the scientific and public health community, I have included a 
brief summary of three such studies. Presentation of these models comes with two 
qualifiers. First, there is substantial scientific work at the foundation of mathematical 
modeling not documented nor intended for this thesis. Secondly, these are three models 
among many more in existence. The purpose in documenting these three is not in 
endorsing the work of any group or individual, but simply to highlight that there is 
substantial support in the scientific community for community mitigation and 




66  Committee on Modeling Community Containment for Pandemic Influenza, Modeling Community 
Containment for Pandemic Influenza: A Letter Report (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 
2006), http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11800.html (accessed January 25, 2007). 
67  Ibid. 
68  Christopher Fraser et al., “Factors that make an Infectious Disease Outbreak Controllable,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101, no. 16 (April 20, 2004), 6151. 
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1.  Los Alamos National Laboratory Model 
In 2006, a joint venture of scientists from the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
and University of Washington detailed mathematical models of pandemic community 
intervention strategies at various levels of R0. 69  The model assumes the absence of close 
match vaccines and contrasts the spread of a pandemic influenza, absent active 
interventions, with modeling using multiple aggressive pharmaceutical and social 
interventions.70   
The Los Alamos Study focused on four proposed mitigation remedies. They 
included variations of targeted antiviral prophylaxis (TAP), influenza vaccination with 
available (close strain) vaccines, comprehensive school closures and aggressive 
restrictions on travel and social distancing measures. When introduced in a timely 
fashion, the Los Alamos Model projected declines in infection rates when various 
combinations of interventions were applied. Figure 5 illustrates results of the Los 
Alamos study71 in projecting declines in infection rates when various combinations of 
interventions are applied. The modeling indicates that administering combinations of 
various interventions will likely have the most effective result in lowering peak pandemic 
levels.   
 
69  Germann et al., Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza in the United States, 5935-5940. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid., 5939. 
 
Figure 5.   Intervention Results. 72 
 
2. The University of Hong Kong Study 
On August 8, 2006, a group of four researchers led by Joseph Wu of the 
University of Hong Kong published findings concerning the modeling of household 
based intervention strategies with respect to pandemic influenza. The modeling 
emphasized by Wu recommends combinations of quarantine, isolation of infected 
individuals and targeted antiviral prophylaxis. The research in this study suggested that, 
even with compliance levels as moderate as 50 percent, intervention strategies would be 
effective73 in reducing infection rates and consequently saving lives. The Wu report 
concluded: 
                                                 
72 Germann et al., Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza in the United States, 5935-5940.  
73  J. T. Wu et al., “Reducing the Impact of the Next Influenza Pandemic using Household-Based 
Public Health Interventions,” PLoS Medicine 3, no. 9 (September 2006), 1536, 
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/request=index-html?request=get-
document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030361 (accessed May 24, 2007).  
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National influenza pandemic preparedness plans currently focus on 
reducing the impact associated with a constant attack rate, rather than on 
reducing transmission. Our findings suggest that the additional benefits 
and resource requirements of household-based interventions in reducing 
average levels of transmission should also be considered, even when 
expected levels of compliance are only moderate.74
3. The Sandia Laboratory Model 
Dr. Robert J. Glass and others associated with the Sandia National Laboratory 
have completed several recent reports on pandemic modeling simulation for the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Infrastructure Protection/Risk Management 
Division. The Sandia Model explores a social network within a conceived small 
community. Much of Glass’s modeling research, including his 2005 report, Local 
Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza,75 focuses particularly on the networks of 
children and teenagers as points of high infectious contact.   Glass pointed out that 
“children and teenagers compose only 29 percent of the population yet they are 
responsible for 59 percent of the infectious contacts, adults for 38 percent and older 
adults for 3 percent.”76 Approximately half of infectious contacts are typically children or 
teenagers among and within their own peers.77  Following the logic of the Sandia 
modeling, restricting the interaction among children and teenagers would have a 
significant impact on the reduction of virus transmission. The Sandia Model supports the 
argument concerning school closures as a highly significant mitigation procedure in a 
pandemic.        
4. Model Summary 
Each of the modeling studies examined was compiled by respected, scientific 
research institutions (Sandia Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the 
 
74  Wu et al., “Reducing the Impact of the Next Influenza Pandemic,” 1532. 
75  R. J. Glass, L. M. Glass and W. E. Beyeler, Local Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza 
(Albuquerque, NM: National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, 2005). 
76  R. J. Glass et al., “Targeted Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza,” Emerging 
Infectious Diseases 12, no. 11 (November 2006), 1674, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no11/06-
0255.htm?s_cid=eid06_0255_e (accessed May 24, 2007).  
77  Ibid., 1674. 
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University of Hong Kong). Each study reached similar conclusions with respect to the 
projected effectiveness of community interventions. Pandemic modeling, as reflected in 
these studies suggest that, mitigation and community intervention strategies would likely 
produce the desired results of lowering morbidity while securing the additional time 
critical for development of more effective vaccine production.  The Sandia Model in 
particular presents transmissibility of a virus within a new dimension of social network 
theory. In each model, mitigation and social interventions can have a positive influence 
on reducing the loss of life and spread of the virus in the absence of an effective vaccine. 
This becomes an important message in shaping and attempting to influence voluntary 
citizen compliance. 
5. Consequences of Interventions  
In 2006, The National Academies sponsored an evaluation of current community 
containment modeling and the historical record of intervention strategies with respect to 
pandemic influenza. The Committee on Modeling Community Containment for Pandemic 
Influenza wrote a “Letter Report” detailing their collective findings.78 An area upon 
which the committee focused significant attention was the secondary effects of 
intervention efforts. Despite the sophistication of mathematical modeling and the 
extrapolation of data from events such as the 2003 SARS experience or the consequences 
of the 1918 Pandemic, there are apt to be significant questions concerning the viability 
and effectiveness of intervention schemes.  All interventions have secondary effects or 
consequences that may not be fully explored or evaluated before the time comes to 
implement them.79 For example, school closures may create significant and unanticipated 
child care issues for families. Children left unattended create entirely new sets of issues 
that communities are required to solve. Early identification and discussion of these issues 
will be an important part of candid pre-event planning. Public understanding of the 
consequences is another important component in formulating compliance.   
 
 
78  Committee on Modeling Community Containment for Pandemic Influenza, Modeling Community 
Containment for Pandemic Influenza: A Letter Report, 1-37. 
79  Ibid. 
 32
D. OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY FOR COMMUNITY MITIGATION 
1. The Objectives of Community Mitigation/Intervention Practice 
A community mitigation strategy will have two important objectives to slowing 
the spread of a deadly influenza virus: 
• The immediate preservation of lives and; 
• Acquiring valuable time sufficient for the development and 
distribution of an effective vaccine that can be produced from a newly 
identified strain of influenza virus.      
  
2. Specific Mitigation and intervention Means 
While these two objectives provide the overreaching goals, the strategies or 
specific responses for community mitigation and intervention are typically referred to as 
a series or combination of non-pharmaceutical (NPI) and available pharmaceutical 
interventions such as antiviral medications used for prophylaxis. Such interventions will 
typically consist of combinations of the following actions: 
• School closures  
• Limiting or avoiding altogether the gathering or congregating of 
significant numbers of individuals in single locations or large public 
venues (sporting events, conventions, trade shows, malls) 
• quarantining of households with sick or infected persons 
• Travel restrictions (including airplanes, buses, trains and boats) 
• Work at home institution by private and government employers 
• Limited religious services and funerals 
• Tightly controlled borders 





                                                
IV. VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND SOCIAL TRUST 
I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth, they can be depended 
upon to meet any national crises. The great point is to bring them the real 
facts.  
— Abraham Lincoln, 16th president of U.S.  
(1809–1865)  
A. WORKING TOWARDS COMPLIANCE 
 Community intervention methods, in order to successful, are likely to require 
personal and public sacrifice in terms of restricting the freedom of individual movement. 
For example, school closures will require children and teenagers to remain at home for 
extended periods; mass transit and air travel will likely see significant reductions and 
cancellations; employers may restrict employees from coming to work or require they 
remain at home. In all probability, the government will lack sufficient resources to 
forcefully employ mitigation efforts on such a large scale while maintaining basic 
services. Subsequent surveys in Canada after the 2003 SARS episode indicated that 
public compliance with interventions was not motivated by any fear of violating the 
law.80 Rather, compliance was largely obtained through education and information put 
forth by the government, which resulted in cooperation and understanding of a greater 
good.  
B. SOCIAL TRUST 
1. Survey on Public Trust 
 In obtaining cooperation and, ultimately, voluntary compliance with intervention 
efforts, there must be a base level of trust between those that represent the government 
and members of a broad and diverse community. With whom and under what conditions 
 
80  Clete DiGiovanni et al., “Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine in Toronto during the 
2003 SARS Outbreak,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 4 
(2004), 3 (accessed December 4, 2006). 
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is the public likely to develop trust? The Pew Research Foundation ran a survey in 
November of 2006 attempting to determine what groups within society have sustained 
levels of trust in others.  Researchers asked three questions of respondents in a telephone 
poll:81
• Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Some 45 percent of 
respondents said most people can be trusted. 
 
• Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? Some 59 percent of respondents said most 
people try to be fair. 
 
• Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves? Some 57 percent of respondents said 
most people try to be helpful. 
 
The Pew research reflected in Figure 6 emphasizes that while there is optimism 
for compliance in several areas of the community, substantial work in trust building 
remains. Particularly, rural and upper middle-class white communities have higher 
indicators for trust than urban, economically depressed areas. While all communities will 
require substantial preparation for a pandemic, the data clearly establishes that a 
substantial amount of work awaits us in the urban areas where high concentrations of 
people live and work. These are obviously key areas of concern for pandemic preparation 
as they will require significant government support and will likely be areas where 
transmissibility of infection may be highest. 
2. Truthfulness in Building Community Trust 
 Community faith in the integrity of the message is important in achieving the 
desired result of compliance. Mark A. Glaser, Lee E. Parker and Stephanie Payton wrote 
a 2001 research report focusing on the issues related to community and self interest. In 
this research they contend: 
 
81  Pew Research Center, Americans and Social Trust: Who, Where, Why (Washington, DC: Pew 
research Center, 2006), http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/SocialTrust.pdf (accessed July 5, 2007). 
 Public leaders must be prepared to truthfully describe the actions of 
government and the state of the community and to articulate the sacrifices 
that will be needed to be made to produce change. This transition toward 
honesty between government and citizens, as well as citizens with 
themselves, will include conflict in values that will not be easily molded 
into respect for the well-being of others.82
 
Figure 6.   Who is more trusting.83 
                                                 
82  Mark A. Glaser, Lee E. Parker and Stephanie Payton, “The Paradox between Community and Self-
Interest: Local Government, Neighborhoods, and Media,” Journal of Urban Affairs 23, no. 1 (2001), 101, 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=2&hid=103&sid=a393941b-0820-4363-9bdd-
ffca1d27492e%40sessionmgr102 (accessed July 13, 2007). 
83  Pew Research Center, Americans and Social Trust: Who, Where, Why, 1-7. 
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The public (the community) will be required to fully understand the consequences 
of compliance with government-imposed restrictions as well as the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of avoidance. Glaser et al., suggest “the restoration of the trust 
of citizens and the elevation of community in the value systems of citizens will be 
facilitated through processes that are open to public inspection and consideration.”84 
What Glaser is referring to is the transparency of planning, another key component of 
compliance. 
C.  PUBLIC PANDEMIC EDUCATION 
 In spite of strategic planning at the federal or state level, the public education 
component of that planning is generally confined to government web pages or strategic 
planning documents. Public familiarity with pandemic influenza is alarmingly deficient. 
A 2006 Harvard School of Public Health Opinion Poll85 revealed that 58 percent of the 
respondents had no knowledge of what the meaning of a pandemic actually is.86 Only 41 
percent of the respondents knew what the term “pandemic flu” was referring to. In order 
to comply with many of the extensive intervention measures that will be proposed at the 
onset of a pandemic, awareness and knowledge levels must be raised considerably.  
1. The Harvard Study  
In the Harvard survey, when the consequences of a pandemic flu were explained to the 
respondents, answers reflected higher levels of potential compliance. In terms of limiting 
attendance at large events and restricting travel, the responses were quite positive, as 
represented in Figure 7. One of the commonly discussed intervention options, and one 
that will have wide-ranging application for pandemic influenza, is school closures. The 
Glass Modeling Study87 in particular, emphasized the potential value in school closures 
 
84  Glaser, Parker and Payton, The Paradox between Community and Self-Interest: Local Government, 
Neighborhoods, and Media, 101. 
85  Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson and Kathleen J. Weldon, Pandemic Influenza and the Public: 
Survey Findings (Boston, MA: Harvard School of Public Health, 2006), 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/panflu/panflu_charts.ppt  (accessed July 14, 2007). 
86  Ibid. 
87  Glass et al., Targeted Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza, 1671-1681. 
as an effective mitigation strategy. However, school closures will have wide-ranging 
impacts on a community and on families in particular. When surveyed in the Harvard 
Study relative to their ability to keep children home from school (Figure 8), the results 
are both encouraging and provide insightful areas that require continued support and 
assistance to the community.  Yes, families are willing to keep children home from 
school, but some assistance with that may be required. This is an area where community 
groups and volunteers, prepared well in advance, may be particularly valuable. 
 
 
Harvard School of Public Health Project on the Public and Biological Security, Pandemic Influenza Survey, October 2006.
Willingness to Cooperate with 













Limit use of public transport
Cancel non-critical MD appts
Reduce contact with people 
outside household
Avoid church services 
Postpone family events
 
Figure 7.   Willingness to Cooperate.88 
 
 
                                                 
88 Glass et al., Targeted Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza, 1671-1681. 
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If recommended by health officials, could keep children from taking public transportation, 
going to public events and gathering outside home while schools closed for 3 months
Would need help with problems of having children at home
Family




A lot/some Only a little/None
% of those with responsibility for children age 5-17
 
Figure 8.   School Closings. 89 
 
 
What this study clearly highlights is areas that require the investment of continued 
research and focus. For example, what can the government or volunteer groups do to be 
of assistance to those families requiring help with keeping children home?  
2. The Keystone Center Study 
The Keystone Center is a non-profit organization for science and public policy 
development. The center assembled a representative group of 50 community stakeholders 
and 260 citizen representatives from dispersed areas of the country, represented by four 
cities to discuss potential community mitigation efforts and render favorable or 
unfavorable dispositions on each.90  
                                                 
89  Blendon, Benson and Weldon, Pandemic Influenza and the Public: Survey Findings, 17. 
90  Keystone Center, The Public Engagement Project on Community Control Measures for Pandemic 
Influenza (Keystone, CO: The Keystone Center, 2007), 
http://www.keystone.org/spp/documents/FinalReport1_CommunityControl5_2007.pdf (accessed July 14, 
2007). 
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The Public Engagement Project On Community Control Measures for 
Pandemic Influenza was carried out in October and November 2006 to 
engage the public in discussions and deliberations about the economic and 
social tradeoffs associated with community control measures to slow the 
spread of the disease.91
 
The results of the study represented in Table 3 reflect generally favorable attitudes 
toward many of the most prominent community intervention options that have been 
considered or thought to be effective. Majorities of participants in the study supported the 
use of individual mitigations or combinations of interventions. The positive attitudes 
reflected in the study support the contention that if the population is educated and aware 
of the consequences of pandemic influenza, they are likely to voluntarily comply with 
mitigations. Like the Harvard School of Public Health Study, The Keystone Center’s 
study is indicative of a substantial base of community support for mitigation efforts. 
 
 
Table 3.   Stakeholders Supporting Intervention.92 
 
                                                 
91  Keystone Center, The Public Engagement Project. 
92  Ibid. 
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D. INFORMATION FLOW 
 In an era of preparation for emergency response, the public must know, precisely, 
what the threat, consequences and alternatives available may be. Restrictions on 
movement, work or school closures will likely be weeks or possibly months in duration.93 
This may be cause for unprecedented social unrest, stress and the accompanying concerns 
about basic subsistence. Public messages should emphasize adaptive behaviors and 
immediately refute myths or contradictory declarations that will likely arise.94 The 
government must move to provide relief in those areas that are clear concerns to the 
community such as assistance with children at home, economic loss or travel restriction. 
Post 9/11, the American public is well versed on the threat of terrorism. Pandemic 
influenza, however, is a concept or reality far less familiar to the average person.  
In The Great Influenza, Barry writes extensively about the Administration of 
Woodrow Wilson and the extensive efforts to suppress public discussion of the 
devastating effects of influenza the country was experiencing in 1918.95 According to 
Barry, Wilson feared that disclosing the condition of the country fighting a disease would 
alert our enemies to a domestic weakness. Unknown to Wilson, Germany and other 
European countries were enduring the same peril. The inference drawn by Barry (and 
others) is that a lack of collective public education contributed to excessive loss of life. 
Thomas Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana of the Bloomberg School of Public 






93  Bootsma and Ferguson, The Effect of Public Health Measures on the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in 
U.S. Cities, 7592. 
94  Dori B. Reissman et al., “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Adaptive Responses to an Evolving 
Challenge,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 2 (2007, 2006), 12, 
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss2/13 (accessed April 5, 2007). 
95  Barry, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History, 545. 
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The issue of trust bears significantly on 2 critical aspects of medical and 
public health response to bioterrorism: (1) the choice of strategies for 
effective communication with the public, and (2) the processes for 
debating, as a society, some of the more ethically complex dimensions of 
disease containment.96  
 
 While pandemic influenza is not bioterrorism, the protocol in dealing with the 
public is similar in many respects.  The results of the Pew Center survey as well as the 
Harvard Public Health survey suggests that there is a substantial foundation of trust upon 
which to build.  
1. Communication 
 Open and frequent communication will become the facilitator of public education 
and the foundation of building trust leading to compliance with mitigation efforts. 
Uncertainty and confusion will likely be, at times, unavoidable consequences of a 
pandemic and ever present in pre-pandemic planning. Nothing compromises integrity and 
trust more than contradictory information. In order to limit these effects, the government 
will be required to provide reassurance, constant updates on relief measures being 
employed, and provide guidance and actions that citizens can take to protect 
themselves.97   
During the 2003 SARS episode in Toronto, Ontario, one of the most perplexing 
situations to control was contradictory and misleading information provided through the 
media.98 This is a problem frequently encountered in emergency response situations. It 
will never be possible to eliminate or pre-approve media coverage of large events. The 
key is for leadership to ensure that the government has the most consistent, visible and 
credible media presence and information for public consumption.       
 
96  T. A. Glass and M. Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a City Against 
Panic,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 34, no. 2 (12/03/2001, 2002), 221, 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v34n2/011333/011333.web.pdf (accessed June 27, 
2007). 
97  Glass and Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People.” 220. 
98  Fantino, 2003 SARS Outbreak: The Response of the Toronto Police Service, 3. 
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Stephen Covey in his recent book, The Speed of Trust, writes that “transparency 
will create trust fast.”99 Covey’s message, written for individual relationships but with 
certain application to government or private enterprise, is that openness, regardless of 
consequence, removes much of the suspicion and consternation the public may have 
toward government. As the consequences of a pandemic (accelerated mortality and 
morbidity rates) and intended government response actions are made fully known to the 
public, cooperation and compliance will likely increase proportionately. In retrospect, 
President Wilson’s policy of illusion and concealment in 1918 contributed to less 
security, not more. 
2. Community Leaders and Existing Institutions  
 Within every community there are pre-existing leaders and institutions that 
interact and provide service on a daily basis. Many of these leaders can be utilized to 
disseminate and collect information.100 Faith-based organizations, civic groups, veterans 
groups and local elected officials provide critical sources of instant credibility with 
community members. Community policing coordinators recognized this as an effective 
element of planning and implementation early in the process, and immediately sought the 
cooperation of targeted leaders.  
Schools and private employers are critical organizations that interact with and 
share mutual interests of families and members of the community. These institutions will 
have extensive economic, social and moral investment in reducing the spread of a deadly 
influenza. Employers, particularly, will have unique influence with employees. 
Employees will require some confidence in knowing that, with interventions, their pay 
and benefits will continue uninterrupted or their employment is secure. Employers, 
conversely, will wish to limit economic losses and know that ill workers cannot perform 
vital production tasks and will spread virus within their facilities. Employers speaking to 
 
99  Stephen R. Covey, The Speed of Trust, 1st ed., Vol. 1 (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 154, 
(accessed July 3, 2007).  
100  Reissman et al., Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Adaptive Responses to an Evolving 
Challenge, 13. 
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employees about the critical need to employ community intervention plans will have a 
level of instant credibility, built over a period of years.        
3. Panic and Fear 
 The fact remains that in spite of preventative measures and practice, significant 
numbers of people may acquire influenza during a pandemic and ultimately succumb to 
its effects. On a significant scale, this will cause unease, possible panic and an inevitable 
surge on the medical infrastructure.101 Any interruption to basic needs, such as food, 
medicine and clean water, will be cause for upheaval in communities. With so much at 
stake, intervention strategies require unprecedented public/private partnerships. The more 
information and detail that can be provided prior to a pandemic will serve as a 
psychological inoculation against fear and panic.102  Informing the public of the 
consequences of a pandemic will prepare them for trying circumstances that will 
inevitably follow. 
E. SUMMARY 
 Pandemic modeling efforts continue to support community intervention measures 
and planning. Perhaps even more encouraging are the recent studies emanating from the 
Harvard School of Public Health,103 the Pew Research Center and the Keystone Center 
on issues concerning potential compliance and existing levels of public trust. Each of 
these studies or surveys indicates that a significant portion of the public would likely 
support government intervention efforts in mitigating a pandemic. The existing research  
suggest that the public is willing to make the necessary and difficult daily adjustments 
required to reduce a pandemic peak, save lives and acquire valuable time to produce 
vaccines.  
 
101  Glass and Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a City Against Panic, 
220. 
102  Ibid., 220. 
103  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu, Large Majority of 
Americans Willing to make Major Changes in their Lives, 1-4. 
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However, there are areas of concern in these studies as well. The Harvard Study 
in particular points to a concerning level of public ignorance regarding pandemic 
influenza.104 We may be educating government emergency planners very well, but the 
necessary information is not reaching the public in the current format.  Building trust and 
transparency of planning must become more than mere concepts; they must become 
practices. In essence, the data is suggesting that the community is willing to be led, but 
currently lacks leadership and direction in pandemic preparation.   
 
 
104  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu. 
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V. COMMUNITY POLICING/HOMELAND SECURITY 
POLICING MODEL 
A. PUBLIC HEALTH AND DISEASE MITIGATION 
1. A Declining Presence of Public Health 
Attributable in large part to its own success in mitigating and eradicating an 
assortment of historically infectious diseases105 (polio, smallpox etc), the role of public 
health agencies has been incrementally marginalized over several decades. The capacity 
of Public Health to act as a first responder in a post 9/11 world has been hindered by 
reduced services or stagnated funding.106 In Massachusetts, for example, the Public 
Health response to routine infectious disease cases is typically delegated to a local city or 
town public health department. In the larger cities, these departments may be staffed by 
full-time professionals, but in many towns, the service, if provided at all, is covered by 
part-time employees with limited staff, minimal budgets and questionable training. As a 
consequence, existing community outreach programs or operational capability within 
Public Health suitable for a broad, community-wide, pandemic awareness and education 
initiative are typically fragmented if available at all. Achieving voluntary public 
compliance with community mitigation efforts will require a substantial and 
comprehensive pre-pandemic outreach and engagement program. Government web sites 
containing research documents, statistical reports or brochures espousing the perils of a 
pandemic will fall considerably short of a preparedness objective.  While state public 
health organizations posses the requisite subject matter expertise concerning pandemic 
and infectious disease, few public institutions possess the operational experience and 
community engagement capability required to effectively carry out a compliance 
 
105  National Governor’s Association, State Strategies for Fully Integrating Public Health into 
Homeland Security, 2. 
106  Patricia D. Reed, “Integrating Public Health Agencies into the Homeland Security Community” 
(Master of Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School), 10,  
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/theses/07Mar_Reed.pdf&code=a089965cbf733e463e876c8dcf65fd39 
(accessed July 9, 2007). 
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campaign. The Community Policing, Problem Orientated Policing and the most recent 
Homeland Security Policing models provide an established framework for a collaborative 
law enforcement/public health initiative aimed at public engagement for pandemic 
mitigation.   
2. The Importance of Existing Relationships 
Community mitigation efforts, in order to be successful, will require extensive 
cooperation and communication in areas of the community not necessarily familiar to 
public health operations. Many communities are traditionally uncooperative with law 
enforcement. Communication will be required between and among government, private 
industry, community organizations and individuals. There is currently a significant void 
in leading and organizing this effort for pandemic preparedness. This is a void that the 
community policing approach, though not necessarily the police, is well suited to fill. 
Pre-existing relationships developed to implement community policing initiatives that 
have been established with schools, businesses, civic and faith-based groups provide an 
established pathway to the community. Law enforcement agencies, through the 
community policing initiatives of the 1990’s and by way of transformation to Homeland 
Security responsibilities of today, have established relationships with all of the key 
constituencies. Creating a similar model using these same established relationships in 
order to implement a comprehensive community mitigation strategy for pandemic 
influenza would be a practical solution for implementation.  
B. CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
 Community policing practice is predicated on two critical components: 
community partnership and problem solving.107 Relationship building through  
 
 
107  Community Policing Consortium, Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf  
(accessed July 1, 2007). 
collaborative problem solving and providing opportunities for educational108 initiatives 
and community awareness have contributed extensively to building community 
partnerships and trusted partnerships. 
1. Trust Based Partnerships 
 Partnerships between individuals or groups with a common objective or mutual 
interest require levels of trust built over time. That trust results from positive and 
consistent interactions. That trust is based on established, open and dependable lines of 




Figure 9.   Trust Communication Cycle.109 
 
While the trust communication cycle illustrates the basic requirements of the 
partnership process, in reality the challenge of implementing such a model varies from 
one community to another. The Pew research suggests that social trust is affected by 
                                                 
108  Edward P. Richards and others, The Role of Law Enforcement in Public Health Emergencies 
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2006), 
http://www.policeforum.org/upload/Pandemic%20FINAL_289750054_182007082257.pdf (accessed 
January 18, 2007). 




                                                
variables in a community such as racial composition, socio-economic conditions and 
varying levels of education among community members.110 All of this suggests that trust 
and partnership building must be a hands-on, interactive process. Trust is a personal 
process and the result of a consistent investment. It is not likely that trust can be 
developed through the distribution of a television advertisement or a crafty webpage.  
2. Problem Solving  
 The second critical component of a viable community policing model is an 
effective problem solving111 relationship. While many of the problem-solving initiatives 
in community policing have concerned crime problems, historically this interaction has 
expanded to include an assortment of neighborhood issues. Community policing has 
solved issues related to rubbish collection, clean streets, traffic light maintenance or an 
assortment of concerns community members may have. The critical component of this 
relationship is the one-on-one interaction, a relationship that has few parallels in any 
other government/community interaction. After 9/11, this problem solving relationship 
between police and the community expanded on the basis of a perceived, omnipresent 
terrorist threat.112 Law enforcement and the community established a mutual and 
expanding interest in such areas as critical infrastructure protection and intelligence 
gathering. In some communities, a sense of urgency and fear of terrorism has galvanized 
the police/community partnership. Logically, this could be extended further to include 
preparation for natural disasters and pandemic influenza. Figure 10 illustrates the cycle 
of problem solving. 
 
110 Pew Research Center, Americans and Social Trust: Who, Where, Why. 
111  Community Policing Consortium, Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action, 
18. 
112  Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman, “Community Policing and Terrorism,” Journal of 
Homeland Security (2003), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/articles/scheider-chapman.html 
(accessed July 4, 2007). 
 
Figure 10.   Problem Solving Cycle.113 
 
 
 This model provides a vehicle to facilitate two-way information flow. The value 
specific to pandemic influenza preparation is the ability to educate the public while 
concurrently building partnerships in trust through continual communication. These 
methods and practices of community policing are an important component of a 
compliance strategy. A collaborative alliance between elected officials, police, public 
health, the business community, faith-based organizations, community leaders and 
members of the community themselves will be a likely  path to implementing an effective 
community mitigation strategy.114    
C. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING   
 Writing for the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in 1998, Daniel W. 
Flynn captured the essence of community policing theory. 
Within the realm of problem-oriented policing, many police departments 
have successfully formed community partnerships with various groups 
within their jurisdiction, and confronted individual problems of specific 
concern to those groups. These efforts are solid problem-oriented policing 
tactics, which are also core elements of community policing.  Community 
                                                 
113  Community Policing Consortium, Understanding Community Policing; A Framework for Action, 
19. 




                                                
policing, however, extends beyond the strategy of treating individual 
problems by addressing the collective problems of a community. Thus, the 
non-traditional community is more than a special interest group or a group 
formed around one issue.115
  
1. The Original Community Policing 
 Community Policing is a methodology or strategy that changed the approach to 
law enforcement, placing a greater emphasis on problem solving, collaboration and 
building partnerships with members of the community.116 117 With substantial 
Department of Justice grant funding and supported by both anecdotal and statistical 
successes, major metropolitan police agencies engaged with community leaders, 
organizations and businesses to solve community concerns. Influenced in great measure 
by George Kelling and James Wilson’s 1982 Atlantic Monthly article, Broken 
Windows,118 the resulting relationships between the police and the community were 
noteworthy testaments to a newly discovered effectiveness of police/community 
interaction. Problem solving, collaboration and cooperative partnerships were outgrowths 
and tangible results of a common trust between police (government) and citizens. Willard 
M. Oliver has written several articles on the evolution of American policing from 
inception to present methodologies. During the 1990’s, Oliver, while trying to define the 
precise composition of community policing, concluded that: 
There was a consensus that it includes police and community partnerships, 
community and police empowerment, the use of problem solving methods, 
and tailor made responses to address local crime and order maintenance 
issues, there can be no mold from which community policing is cut.119
 
115  Daniel W. Flynn, Defining the “Community” in Community Policing (Washington, DC: Police 
Executive Research Foundation, 1998), 
http://www.policeforum.org/upload/cp_570119206_12292005152452.pdf (accessed June 14, 2007). 
116  Ibid. 
117  Community Policing Consortium, Understanding Community Policing:  A Framework for Action, 
13. 
118  James Q. Wilson and George Q. Kelling, “Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, 
1982, 1, http://www.the atlantic.com/doc/198203/broken-windows,  (accessed January 20, 2007). 
119  W. M. Oliver, “Community Policing: A Conceptual Framework Willard M. Oliver, Elaine Bartgis 
the Authors,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 21, no. 3 (1998), 9, 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/
Articles/1810210308.html (accessed July 12, 2007). 
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Much of community policing practice, however, was about re-establishing contact and 
interpersonal relationships between the police and members of the community. In some 
respects, it became more about police attending meetings and public relations events. The 
actual value of community policing as a crime reduction technique was continuously 
debated within and without law enforcement. While some aspects of community policing 
such as interaction with the community held promise, more tangible results were 
necessary to justify its continuance. As a result, community policing required refinement 
and further evolution.      
2. Problem Orientated Policing 
In a sense, Community Problem Orientated Policing (CPOP) was a competing 
philosophy with community policing early on. The differences between the two, perhaps 
subtle to those outside law enforcement, were significant to practitioners.  Unlike earlier 
versions of community policing, CPOP valued not simply developing relationships with 
the community, but collaborative efforts at solving problems.120 CPOP was instituted as a 
problem-solving partnership mechanism with the community and not just police officers 
interacting closely or just attending meetings for the sake of public relations. Ultimately, 
tangible problem solving, the philosophy of CPOP, was integrated into overall 
community policing as pressure mounted to show more for the investment than simply 
police officers riding bicycles or walking beats. None the less, the core value of CPOP 
meshes very well with Homeland Security concerns raised after 9/11.  
3. Homeland Security Policing 
There is little debate that the events of 9/11, the subsequent anthrax attacks and 
Hurricane Katrina changed the landscape of public safety and first responders. Our 
national readiness and response vulnerabilities were painfully exposed. After 9/11, 
federal grant funding for law enforcement was abruptly redirected from community 
policing initiatives to Homeland Security preparedness and response capability. The 
 
120  Darrel Stephens, The Challenges to the Future of Community Policing (Washington, DC: Police 
executive Research Foundation, The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2004), 
http://www.policeforum.org/upload/CommunityPolicingReduced_570119206_12292005152352.pdf  
(accessed July 10, 2007). 
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anthrax incidents emphasized the need for collaborative, multi-disciplined responses. 
Hurricane Katrina pointed out the need for broad based National Incident Management 
training across disciplines. 
Darrel W. Stephens and Francis X. Hartmann, in a 2002 report of the Executive 
Session on Domestic Preparedness at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University, described The Policing Challenge and wrote:  
 Over the decade, the police have become better at connecting with the 
community and working in a partnership to solve problems; they have 
learned a great deal about how to engage people in activities that deter 
criminal acts and decrease fear. These skills should be put to use in 
helping mobilize the community to undertake projects and initiate 
programs that will have the dual purpose of preparing for acts of terror 
while strengthening overall neighborhood safety.121  
 
Written months after 9/11, Stephens and Hartman were writing about a transition in 
policing that was well underway. The authors recognized the valuable lessons of 1980’s 
and 90’s policing and how those lessons could be transitioned to homeland security.  
More recently, Willard Oliver has written The Fourth Era of Policing: Homeland 
Security.  In this latest evolution of modern policing, Oliver maintains that since 2001, 
following cuts in traditional federal law enforcement funding programs, a hybrid, 
Homeland Security Policing design has evolved from the original Community Policing 
concept.122 In describing what the new Homeland Security policing model will look like, 
Oliver states: 
While police and citizen participation may be mixed based upon the threat, 
police will have to link with other agencies, both governmental and non-
governmental in order to implement nearly any type of security measure. 





121  Darryl Stephens and Francis X. Hartmann, Beyond the Beltway: Focusing on Hometown Security 
– the Policing Challenge (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University [2002]), 
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/beyond_the_beltway.pdf  (accessed June 14, 
2007). 
122  William M. Oliver, “The Fourth Era of Policing: Homeland Security,” International Review of 
Law, Computers & Technology 20, no. 1 & 2 (March - July 2006, 2006). 
enforcement, it will include those in the medical and mental health 
community, and it will draw heavily upon such agencies as public works, 
water treatment, and transportation.123
 
 Willard Oliver’s assessment of Homeland Security Policing is orientated toward 
terrorism mitigation, intelligence gathering and traditional law enforcement. I propose 
that this newest evolution of the Homeland Security policing has actually been extended 
beyond the realm of terrorism to include natural disasters and public health emergencies. 
























                                                
 
Figure 11.   Homeland security Policing. 
 
 
Homeland Security Orientated Policing places emphasis on the unification of first 
responder capability. This is reflected in the recent mandate for National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) training for all first responders, regardless of discipline. 
 
123  Oliver, “The Fourth Era of Policing: Homeland Security,” 59. 
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Homeland Security Policing recognizes that in any prevention, response or recovery the 
skills and expertise required extend beyond the capability of any one responder agency.  
This is particularly true and well suited for pandemic preparation and community 
containment.    
D. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
 It has been argued that pandemic preparation is a public health issue that has little 
relevance to traditional law enforcement responsibilities.124 Public health officials have 
contended that security agencies (law enforcement and fire services in particular), while 
receiving the majority of attention (and funding) post 9/11, are not in the business of 
disease prevention. The argument contends that a pandemic is a public health issue and 
law enforcement has no practical experience with such an endeavor.125  Further, 
segments of the public health establishment have suggested that police presence will 
interfere and likely impede public participation and compliance. One of the key 
arguments is that alliances with law enforcement may be viewed, in certain communities 
such as high crime communities, as justification for refusing to cooperate with public 
health.126  This is a legitimate point and one that law enforcement has to recognize as 
valid. There are segments of the community, particularly in minority and economically 
suppressed communities, where experiences with police have not always been positive or 
trusting.  This argument serves to support the contention that collaborative, multi-agency 
approaches to homeland security will overcome individual agency shortcomings or 
deficiencies. 
E. THE OVERARCHING OBJECTIVES  
 Obtaining the voluntary compliance of community members with mitigation and 
intervention efforts will most likely be the result of a collaborative and unified effort. 
This proposal will integrate public health, as a lead agency, into the current community 
 
124  Tee L. Guidotti, “Public Health and Patriotic Doubts,” HSI Journal of Homeland Security (2002), 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/search/searchResults.asp  (accessed July 4, 2007).  
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid. 
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policing/Homeland Security policing model. The investments made by law enforcement 
during the 1990s in the practice of community policing created a unique foundation upon 
which cooperation and problem solving can be built upon.127 Recognizing that in some 
areas, those relationships have not been all good, government must look toward 
partnerships with faith-based groups, volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross, 
employers and community leaders to improve them. The new model of Homeland 
Security Policing will be characterized by collaborative efforts of multiple agencies; 
public, private and voluntary, working with a common objective of preventing the loss of 
life and ensuring security of the Homeland. 
 
127  Ellen Scrivner, The Impact of September 11 on Community Policing (Washington, DC: Police 
Executive Research Foundation, 2004), 
http://www.policeforum.org/upload/CommunityPolicingReduced_570119206_12292005152352.pdf  
(accessed June 14, 2007). 
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VI. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ACHIEVING VOLUNTARY 
COMPLIANCE 
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM  
 In 1918, Massachusetts was one of the many states particularly hard hit by 
pandemic influenza. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
within a period of weeks and months, pandemic was raging in Massachusetts.  
Scarcely six weeks after it touched the first sailor on Commonwealth Pier, 
the pandemic was raging all across the state. By October 1st, the Public 
Health Service estimated that there were at least 75,000 cases in the state, 
excluding those from the military camps. 
 
At that point, nearly 800 people had already died from influenza here in 
Boston. Another 200 had perished from pneumonia. By the time the next 
week ended, nearly 1,300 more Bostonians had died. 
 
By the time the pandemic finally passed, an estimated 45,000 people had 
perished in Massachusetts. That is about two-thirds of a sellout crowd at a 
Patriots game, or more than two consecutive sell-outs at Boston Garden. 
 
When it comes to pandemics, there is no rational basis to believe that the 
early years of the 21st century will be different than the past. If a 
pandemic strikes, it will come to Massachusetts.128
 
  —U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
 
In 1918, there was no vaccine available for the pandemic. Should a pandemic 
influenza begin today, despite current plans, this country would be no better off than in 
September of 1918.  An estimated fifty million people worldwide allegedly died as a 
result of the 1918 pandemic.129 Current estimates suggest a modern pandemic, with a 
vastly expanded global population and jet transportation, may result in over a 100 million 
 
128  United States Department of Health and Human Services, “The Great Pandemic of 1918: State by 
State,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/greatpandemic2.html#massachusetts (accessed August 4, 2007). 
129  United States Center for Disease Control, “Pandemic Flu: The Facts,” United States Center for 
Disease Control, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/news/PDFs/pandemicfluthefacts_eng.pdf (accessed August 
5, 2007). 
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deaths worldwide. Given the magnitude of the potential problem and the size of the 
United States population, it would seem that radio and television advertisement alone, 
while arguably a component of an awareness campaign, are woefully insufficient to 
adequately prepare a community for an event with such potentially devastating 
consequences.  
1. The Public Challenge 
 The challenge with respect to pandemic intervention is not in the creation of or 
existence of plans; pandemic plans and strategies abound. Rather, the challenge will lie in 
widespread public acceptance, participation, understanding and ultimately, compliance 
with those plans. Unfortunately, those likely to read and comprehend currently available 
guidance or pandemic plans will not be the members of the community who’s 
compliance and cooperation will be critical to success. It is not probable that individual 
states, where the real burden of a pandemic will exist,130 or the federal government will 
have suitable resources to forcefully compel comprehensive, large-scale interventions 
simultaneously across the country during a pandemic. Despite extensive federal guidance 
and an array of both federal and state pandemic plans, planning efforts are essentially 
silent with respect to guidance in accomplishing the necessary levels of cooperation and 
compliance from the community that will be so vital in this effort to save lives.    
2. Government 
 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released its Pandemic 
Influenza Plan in 2005, a 200-page document. The federal government’s plan amounts to 
more of a reference document than an actionable plan.131 HHS, the primary federal 
cabinet responsible for national pandemic preparation, recently released “Pandemic Flu 
Update IV.”132  In the report, the government discussion of pandemic flu continues to be 
 
130  Staff of the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the 
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Thoughts and Comments, 293. 
131  Ibid., 292. 
132  Michael Leavitt, Pandemic Planning Update IV (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2007), http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/panflureport4.pdf (accessed August 
4, 2007). 
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dominated by discussions concerning vaccine production and capacity. In terms of 
community mitigation efforts and the government’s education campaign, the strategy, in 
terms of delivering this to the community, is summarized in the following:  
In February 2007, HHS launched a series of television and radio public 
service announcements (PSA) in English and Spanish to raise awareness 
of pandemic influenza and to educate the public about the steps people can 
take now to prepare. The PSA, released under the title Know What to Do 
about Pandemic Flu, were distributed to 300 television and 1,000 radio 
stations across the country.133
 
B. FRAMING THE INTERVENTION COMPLIANCE STRATEGY 
1. Strategy Canvas 
 A strategy canvas (Figure 12) illustrates the shifting emphasis or value of a 
community mitigation strategy, as opposed to the more prevalent existing emphasis on 
vaccine-based solutions. The existing pandemic preparation plans in many states, for 
example, focus on pharmaceutical remedies or existing traditional mitigations such as 
encouraging cough etiquette or the distribution and use of surgical masks to slow virus 
transmission. These are typically the established response choices that have worked for 
other public health threats.  Unfortunately, pandemic influenza on a scale of the 1918 
variety presents a threat of proportions not routinely encountered by public health 
organizations. Therefore a shift to the new compliance strategy is necessary. 
 

















































































Figure 12.   Community Intervention Strategy.134 
 
2. The Framework for Compliance 
 A framework is applied to illustrate and evaluate the contributing factors or 
elements necessary to achieve community compliance. This community mitigation 
strategy deemphasizes the traditional rules of forced compliance (fines, arrest and 
incarceration) and encourages public engagement through education and transparency. 
Through community based pandemic education, the consequences of non-compliance 
such as death or spread of a deadly virus become better understood while the dependence 
on traditional vaccine remedies decline. Communities, through voluntary compliance, 
become more resilient, self-reliant and less dependent on a government provided vaccine 
that may be months from production and availability. Figure 13 provides a graphic 
illustration of the fundamentals of the framework for this compliance strategy. 
 
                                                 
134 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard 
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Figure 13.   Four Action Framework.135 
 
  
Compliance is dependent on the effectiveness of the four actions framework, each 
contributing to a lessening of resistance while raising trust and confidence in the process. 
Each component, along with its value to the mitigation strategy, is described in further 
detail. 
a. Eliminate  
• Pervasive levels of public ignorance regarding pandemic influenza. 
The Harvard Study136 on compliance factors recorded a 58 percent 
ignorance level concerning what the term “pandemic” actually 
referred to. No individual will be willing to comply with restrictive 
interventions if they don’t understand the consequences first. 
 
                                                 
135 Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strateg.y. 
136  Harvard School of Public Health, In the Case of an Outbreak of Pandemic Flu, Large Majority of 
Americans Willing to make Major Changes in their Lives, 1-4. 
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• A false sense of security and dependency on vaccines and 
questionably effective anti-viral medications. If the community 
buys into this government fueled belief that vaccines will be 
available, cooperation and compliance will be unlikely. 
 
b. Raise 
• The awareness and understanding level of the community as to the 
threat presented by pandemic and consequences for non-
compliance 
 
• The level of confidence and faith that the community has in itself 
and government with respect to pandemic preparation. Instilling a 
belief that community action can save lives. 
 
c. Create 
• Community involvement in the preparation and planning process. 
Individuals will have more motivation and faith in a plan that has 
been brought before them complete with an opportunity to ask 
questions, gather facts and contribute to a plan that affects them 
directly. 
 
• Trust in the process. When planning is confined to television 
commercials, fancy brochures or edicts from Washington D.C., it 
becomes an impersonal process. A lesson from community 
policing is that individuals bestow trust and faith in others only 
when they can make a personal assessment of credibility and 
candor. 
 
• Transparency of planning is putting the planning process out front 
where it is viewable to the public long before implementation. 
With honest risk communication and openness, the community can 
make informed judgments on compliance. Studies such as the 
Harvard and Keystone center study indicate that when properly 
informed of the consequences, community members are likely to 
comply with directives and restrictive measures.    
 
d. Reduce 
• Fear is an ever present emotion in any disaster planning. With 
advance risk communication, the community is better informed 
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and, as such, better prepared to do what is requested. Awareness 
and information become an “inoculation” for fear. 
 
• Resistance to intervention measures through informative action, 
risk communication, education and transparency of planning. 
 
C. A COMMUNITY POLICING ORIENTATED COMPLIANCE TEAM 
 At the state and local level, the American Public Health Association contends that 
public health agencies are typically overburdened with their day-to-day commitments 
without the added responsibilities of preparing for a pandemic.137 Public health, acting 
alone, lacks the resources and structure to effectively reach wide segments of the 
population in a manner similar to the community policing initiatives.  
Alternatively, law enforcement, while experienced in grassroots community 
policing initiatives, lacks the specific public health training and expertise in pandemic 
preparation and education to achieve such a goal. The solution is in the creation of a 
collaborative statewide team consisting of elected and/or appointed officials, public 
health, law enforcement, emergency management and education experts. The team would 
be assembled and operate under the framework of the Incident Management System, a 
system that is widely recognized and distributed as the standard for Homeland Security 
response.   
D. INCIDENT COMMAND STRUCTURE 
 The Incident Command System (ICS) would make an appropriate framework to 
construct and implement a mitigation compliance team framework. While the ICS was 
designed to manage emergency response and disasters, there is no reason its collaborative 
framework could not be sustained over a longer course of action for a community 
mitigation compliance campaign. The ICS framework will provide a practical format that 
most homeland security providers are familiar with as a result of pre-existing training or 
practical experience. Positions within the Compliance ICS structure will be populated 
 
137  American Public Health Association, APHA’s Prescription for Pandemic Flu (Washington, DC: 
American Public Health Association, 2007), http://www.apha.org/NR/rdonlyres/D5017DB9-F400-4399-
A656-939C4C8DF259/0/FLUpolicycomplete.pdf (accessed August 5, 2007). 
with public health, law enforcement, education professionals, emergency management, 
the private sector, and perhaps other government resources as appropriate. 
Creating an ICS structure for a pandemic-related event would serve the dual 
purpose of creating a structure to attain voluntary compliance and education, as well as 
creating knowledgeable and familiar working groups prepared for a pandemic or other 
disaster scenarios. Figure 14 illustrates the framework and specific areas of the ICS 




Figure 14.   The ICS – Mitigation Compliance Team Diagram.138 
 
                                                 
138 United States Department of Agriculture Forest service, Incident Command System, ICS 




                                                
1. Unified Command  
 The leadership of this team, the Unified Command, will establish the objectives, 
agenda and operational direction of the compliance outreach process. Consisting of 
qualified management members of concerned agencies such as public health, law 
enforcement and emergency management, the Unified Command will constitute the 
leadership of the compliance effort. Members of the executive team should have 
substantial preparedness training backgrounds and specific expertise in the area of 
pandemic or biological threat assessment. The responsibility of the unified pandemic 
team is to provide direction and leadership in instituting a jurisdictional strategy for 
pandemic awareness leading to compliance with mitigation efforts.   
2. Operations 
 The most important and consequently the most visible component of the 
compliance initiative is the operational component. Operations will bring the awareness 
and engagement initiative directly to the community. The critical entities that must be 
represented and employed within the operational level will be schools, faith-based 
organizations, private and government employers and volunteer organizations. At this 
level, it is the pre-existing community policing relationships and structures that make the 
planning and logistical support operational.  
An example of a community initiative can be found in the recent works of a group 
of Stanford University undergraduate students in the Social Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship Program. Working on pandemic preparation, the students have 
proposed community, social networking solutions to pandemic survivability.139  Four of 
the students in particular have presented a comprehensive educational and awareness 
program through a proposed California Public Schools curriculum on pandemic 
education.140  A program such as this, reaching students and parents, would be widely 
 
139  Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Program, “Saving Lives in the Next Pandemic,”  Stanford 
University, http://sie.stanford.edu/1/index.html (accessed August 4, 2007). 
140  Francisco Cai et al., Community Resiliency through Schools (Palo Alto, California: Stanford 
University, 2007), http://sie.stanford.edu/1/reports/community_resiliency.pdf (accessed August 5, 2007). 
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adaptable to any state educational requirement, and would have significant impact and 
immediate results with pandemic awareness and preparedness.   
3. Planning 
 The planning section would have considerable duties related to curriculum and 
learning objective development, liaison with federal and state public health organizations, 
as well as with academic institutions. Populated primarily with public health and 
educational staff, the planning section would develop and refine the curriculum and 
awareness training to prepare the public.  
4. Logistics 
 The logistics section will be tasked with acquiring the necessary equipment, 
facilities and educational material required to conduct community preparedness training. 
Many emergency management personnel are trained and prepared to serve within this 
section for natural disasters already. Logistics would produce informative web postings, 
educational videos, mailings and brochures to further the ends of the awareness 
campaign. Many public service and educational announcements are already in existence 
through the CDC or HHS. The logistics section would be tasked with obtaining and 
targeting their distribution through the various operations units deployed in the 
community.  
5. Finance 
 Large educational undertakings such as this will require substantial financing and 
detailed accounting of expenditures. The finance section would be responsible for 
exploring and acquiring grants and appropriations to underwrite costs. Collaborative, 
multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional efforts such as this can become quite complicated and 
costly. Having experienced grant writers as well as accounting staff dedicated to the 
section, will provide the necessary oversight while ensuring that all appropriate funding 
is aggressively sought.  
 
E. PANDEMIC MITIGATION COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MODEL 
 The role of government is that of a facilitator bringing together the key partners in 
the process of securing compliance with community interventions. Partnerships between 
government (law enforcement, public health, emergency management and elected 
officials), employers, volunteer groups, faith-based groups and schools are established. 
The partnership becomes the operational component or arm of the compliance strategy 
delivering educational awareness, trust, transparency of planning and participation 
directly to the community. Figure 15 illustrates this partnership in operation, creating a 




Figure 15.   The Operational Model. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
 Pandemic preparation and community intervention strategies must be developed 
now, long before the spread of a virus. In spite of high levels of anxiety concerning a 
future pandemic influenza, there is mounting evidence that community mitigation efforts 
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can have a significant, positive affect.141 142 Through intervention efforts, overall 
mortality may be reduced and perhaps more importantly, valuable time may be gained for 
critical vaccine development. Timely instituted mitigation efforts, in order to be truly 
effective, will require significant, voluntary compliance from the community.  
Community mitigation efforts or interventions such as school closures, work at 
home programs, cancellation of large public events or closed public transportation venues 
will likely have cascading consequences143 for the public. The community, in order to 
make informed decisions with potentially life-threatening consequences, needs to fully 
comprehend the risks and consequences of compliance or non-compliance with 
mitigation or intervention strategies. While much has been written or posted concerning 
the ramifications of community interventions or the lack of viable vaccines, that effort is 
not reaching the public. The community policing model and the ICS structure provide a 
viable and tested mechanism to bring the appropriate awareness to the public.     
 
141  Germann et al.,  Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza in the United States, 5935-5940. 
142  Fraser et al.,  Factors that make an Infectious Disease Outbreak Controllable, 6146-6151. 
143  Center for Disease Control, Interim Pre-Pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States, 10. 
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APPENDIX  
Scott Holmber et al., examine the variances that exist in state pandemic plans.144 
An examination of the table highlights the consistency of vaccine and vaccination plans 
(left column) as opposed to the inconsistent and sporadic plans for “community 
containment (far right column).   
 
 
144 Scott D. Holmberg et al., State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza (Triangle Park, N.C.: 
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